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RECENT CASES
provoke the particular crime charged.13 There is dictunl to the effect that
even if the defendant is in the course of committing a crime of some kind,
has already formed the design to engage in it, or is suspected with good
reason, it is a good defense if the officer instigated the crime." The test
turns upon the issue of inducement. "If the accused entertained the criminal
intent before he was afforded the opportunity to violate the law, he is in no
position to plead estoppel." 35 Although there has been no recent opportunity
for the courts of North Dakota to decide the issue of entrapment, they have
in the past laid down a rule which is in accord with the general rule here
stated.i1 The instant case laid. down no new or arbitrary rules concerning
entrapment but was content to accept the law as determined in previous
litigation before Federal courts. In the light of holdings in other recent cases,
the decision of the court seems sound. An officer may ttse trickery or artifice
to test a suspected person by offering him an opportunity to transgress, but
may not put himi under extraordinary temptation."; Such artifice or trickery
is not necessary to a good defense however,' and the grant of a new trial
because of an instruction to the jury naming such conditions as a prerequisite
to acquittal is not contrary to existing law.
BAYARD LEWIS
GAMING-CAME OF CHANCE-FREE GAMES AWARDED FOR HIGH SCORE ON
PINBALL MACHINE HELD PROPERTY WITHIN ANTI-GAMBLING STATUTES. -
Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that a pinball machine installed in
his restaurant was not a gambling device and an injunction prohibiting
enforcement officials from arresting plaintiff, confiscating his machine, or
interfering with its operation and use. The District Court entered judgment
for the plaintiff. On appeal the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that a
pinball machine which gave a free game or games upon the attainment of a
certain minimum score, but in the operation of which the element of chance
predominated over that of skill, was a game of chance played for money, and
its use prohibited. Baedaro v. Caldwell, 56 N.W.2d 706 (Neb. 1953).
The constitutionality of statutes providing for the confiscation of gambling
devices is almost uniformly upheld., The problem of primary importance in
13. United States v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 49, 52 (7th Cir. 1951) (defendant not illegally
entrapped where former inmate of House of Correction was given money by an officer
for the purpose of buying drugs and he induced defendant, also a former member of
same House who recognized him, to procure the drugs); United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d
1007 (2nd Cir. 1933) (where the defendant was regularly distributing obscence matter,
the fact that postal inspectors induced him to ship such matter in interstate commerce
for the purpose of prosecuting him, did not constitute an illegal entrapment); United
States v. Certain Quantities of Intoxicating Liquors, 290 Fed. 824, 826 (D.N.H. 1923)
"In the absence of special circumstances excusing it, a person who, at the suggestion or
instigation of another, commits a crime not particularly affecting an individual in person
or property, is just as guilty as though the design had originated with him, and this is
true, though the suggestion came from an officer of the law."
14. See United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2nd Cir. 1933).
15. State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 89 A.2d 219, 222 (1952).
16. State v. Currie, 13 N.D. 655, 102 N.W. 875 (1905).
17. United States v. Wray, 8 F.2d 429 (N.D. Ga. 1925); Sutton v. State, 59" Ga.
App. 198, 200 S.E. 225 (1938); State v. Boylan, 158 Minn. 263, 197 N.W. 281 (1924).
18. Demos v. United States, 205 F.2d 596, 599 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1953).
1. League for Preservation of Civil Rights and Internal Tranquility v. City of Cincinnati,
64 Ohio App. 195, 28 N.E.2d 660 (1940); see People v. One Pinball Machine, 316 I11.
App. 161. 44 N.E.2d 950, 952 (1942).
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cases of this type is that of determining what constitutes a gambling device
within the terms of the various state statutes. The best manner of treating
this problem is under two headings: the chance element and the award element.
Most states follow the rule that any machine, implement or contrivance for
the playing of an unlawful game of chance or hazard is a gambling devicc."
A game of chance is a game which depends less on the skill and experience
of the player than on accidental circumstances incidental to the manner in
which it is played.: The test which the courts most commonly apply to
determine the character of a specific game is not whether it contains an
clement of chance or an element of skill, but which is the dominating factor
that determines the outcome of the contest.4 Though evidence shows that a
certain degree of skill can be attained through long practice,5 pinball machines
as viewed from the standpoint of the persons that play them, contain an
clement of chance which far outweighs that of skill.° This lack of control
would seem to place it within the category of games of chance.
The second problem involved in the interpretation of the term "gambling
device" is the legal effect of an award returned for playing7 Though many
state statutes contain wide, sweeping terms in their definition of a gambling
device,8 others merely define them as any machine or device played for
"money or property", 0 or for "money or an interest in property" as is the
case in North Dakota.1° Only a very few jurisdictions hold that all machines
of a slot or pinball type are gambling devices per se,11 because most states
2. However disguised the scheme or device, its essential element is that of affording
a chance to get something for nothing. Henry v. Kuney, 280 Mich. 188, 372 N.W. 443
(1937) (The element of chance is the soul of a gambling device); Snyder v. City of
Alliance, 41 Ohio App. 48, 179 N.E. 426 (1931); State v. McTeer, 129 Tenn. 535, 167
S.V. 121 (1914); Milwaukee v. Burns, 225 Wis. 296, 274 N.W. 273 (1937) "chance
is the dominating element that determines the result of the game."
3. Steely v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 554, 164 S.W.2d 977 (1942); Commonwealth
v. Bowman, 267 Ky. 602, 102 S.W.2d 382 (1936); People v. Cohen, 160 Misc. 10,
289 N.Y. Supp. 397 (1936); see Engle v. State, 53 Ariz. 458, 90 P.2d 988, 993 (1939).
4. People v. Lavin, 179 N.Y. 164, 71 N.E. 753 (1904); Shapiro v. Moss, 245 App.
Div. 853, 281 N.Y. Supp. 72 (1935); City of Milwaukee v. Burns, 225 Wis. 296, 274
N.W. 274 (1937).
5. The ordinary pinball machine, such as -was involved in this case, calls for some
degree of skill; that is, 'the player may exert a sufficient degree of skill to influence the
outcome to some extent. However, chance is undoubtedly the predominating factor.
There are several varieties of pinball machines, some requiring more skill than others.
Commonwealth v. Bowman, 267 Ky. 602, 102 S.W.2d 382 (1936); State v. Coats, 158
Or. 122, 74 P.2d 1102, 1106 (1938).
6. State ex rel Dussault v. Kilburn, 111 Mont. 400, 109 P.2d 1113, (1941).
7. Essentially, a game of chance contains three elements: consideration, which is obvious
in the initial coin; chance, which is developed in th text above; and award, as treated
here. See Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 135 Ohio St. 43, 19 N.E.2d 159, 160 (1939).
8. Okla. Stat. Tit. 21 1964 (1941) (Defines slot machines as any machine or device
which is played with a "coin, chip, token, etc. representative of value or a thing
of value".)
9. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann §21-915 (1935).
10. In order to constitute a game of chance which is played for a consideration, the
prize or award which the player may win must he property or an interest in property.
N.D. Rev. Code §12-2301 (1943). While "amusement games" are defined by statute in
such a manner as to include pinball machines. N.D. Rev. Code 153-0401 (1) (1943),
the statute cited, which provides for licensing such machines, does not apply to "any
machine which may constitute a lottery under the laws of this state." N.D. Rev. Code
*53-0401 (1) (1943). A lottery as defined under 112-2401 of N.D. Rev. Code (1943)
is "any scheme for the disposal or distribution of property by chance among persons who
have paid . . .any valuable consideration for the chance of obtaining such property . . ."
11. Alexander v. Hunnicutt, 196 S.C. 364, 13 S.E.2d 630 (1942) (gambling
devices even though played solely for amusement); Prickett v. State, 88 Okla. Cr. 213,
200 P.2d 457 (1948).
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say that their illegality hinges upon the nature of their actual use.1
2 However,
under any type of statute forbidding gambling devices it is generally held
that a machine is illegal if it pays off in tokens exchangeable for merchandise
or usable for free plays.1
3
The major controversy arises when the only "pay-off" by the machine is
the opportunity to play automatically registered free games obtained by
achieving a certain minimum score. The majority of jurisdictions state that
free games represent amusement and are things of value or property and
therefore fall within the statutory prohibitions 14 or that they fall within this
category because they offer the necessary lure to indulge in a gambling
instinct.1 5 Nevertheless, in a large minority of the jurisdictions the word
"property" in statutes similar to that involved in the case treated here is
construed to mean something more tangible such as goods, chattels, effects,
or choses in action, and is said not to include the trivial free amusement
provided by free plays on a pinball machine.1 6
North Dakota has a unique manner of dealing with gambling devices in that
she prohibits them as lotteries."7 The only case tried under this section to date,
states that a pinball machine for which the player pays a valuable consideration
and receives an opportunity, chiefly dependent upon chance, to win a prize
or award which is property, is a lottery as prohibited by law.' 8 In holding
in this manner, the court declared that the exclusive right to operate an
amusement device was a form of property. In short, pinball machines are illegal
under North Dakota law if they award free games. However, the statute has
not been vigorously enforced in this state.
RIc ARD V. WxcxA
INSURANCE-RISKS AND CAUSES OF Loss-Is THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF
RADIUM BURNS AN ACCIDENTAL INtJUY?-Plaintiff entered into a contract to
supply a manufacturing concern with a patented process, materials and
equipment for producing a radioactive ointment. An employee of the
manufacturer sued plaintiff in tort for radium burns suffered over a period
of several months while the employee was operating an emanator used in
the production of the ointment. It was alleged that plaintiff was negligent in
12. State v. Wiley, 232 Iowa 443, 3 N.W.2d 620 (1942); State v. Six Slot Machines,
166 Kan. 361, 201 P.2d. 1039 (1949); State v. Hightower, 156 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941).
13. E.g. Giomi v. Chase, 47 N.M. 22, 132 P.2d 715, 718 (1942); Commonwealth v.
Bowman, 267 Ky..602, 102 S.W.2d 382 (1936).
14. State v. Wiley, 232 Iowa 443, 3 N.W.2d 620 (1942); Commonwealth v. Rivers,
323 Mass. 379, 82 N.E.2d 216 (1948); Giomi v. Chase, 47 N.M. 22, 1.32 P.2d
715 (1942).
15. Painter v. State, 163 Tenn. 627, 45 S.W.2d 46 (1932).
16. Washington Coin Mach. Ass'n. v. Callahan, 142 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1944); State
v. Waste, 156 Kan. 143, 131 P.2d 708 (1942); In re Wigton, 151 Pa. Super. 337, 30
A.2d 352 (1943).
17. It was provided in 39660, N.D. Comp. Laws (1913), that "the playing of an
amusement device, commonly called a pinball machine, which is played for a consideration
and which offers to the player an opportunity, dependent chiefly upon chance, to win
the right to extended free use of the device for periods of varying duration, is a lottery."
When this section was carried over into the 1943 code, the language quoted above was
not included in the revised section. However, the Notes of the Revision Committee state
that the change in language was not intended to affect the meaning of the statute. N.D.
Rev. Code 112-2401 (1943); N.D. Code Revision Notes 12-2401 (1943).
18. Middlemas v. Strutz, 71 N.D. 186, 299 N.W. 589 (1941).
